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Introduction and Overview
The main focus of this presentation is the development of
computer based learning in English schools. Most of what I
have to say probably applies to the rest of the United Kingdom,
but there-are variations which I do not intend to deal with.
My concern is with Government policy and practice, and with the
reasons why, in a country which is committed to evaluating all
venture expenditure, the Government has chosen to insulate its
substantial investment in this development from external
scrutiny. Speaking as a specialist in educational evaluation,
with an interest in theories and strategies of change, I also
want to comment in a more general way on the characteristic
features of CBL as an educational movement and on the political
and economic contexts in which its evolving forms seek a
location in educational practice. CBL has, in global terms, a
long history, but it has seldom been exposed to systematic
examination of its claims. At the present time political
interest in its promotion has intensified and I argue that
there is an urgent need to monitor its further development, not
least because evaluation can help to create shared learning
about its potential and probleMs.
Given this focus on development in schools I shall not, in the
main body of this presentation, have much to say about CBL
research, although I am at this time completing a four-year
evaluation of an IT in education research initiative launched
in 1988 by the national Economic and Social Research Council.
In marked contrast to the Government, the Council commissioned
this work as an explicitly policy oriented evaluation.
Nevertheless, since the link between research and action is an
important consideration,. I shall begin this introduction and
2overview of my presentation with a brief sketch of that context
in Britain, drawing attention to some problematic aspects of
the linkage problem.
My. Government has spent a substantial sum of money over the
past twenty-five years modernising and sustaining the computer
facilities of our universities, most of it to enhance their
research capabilities, some of it for administration. This
expenditure has not been evaluated, but at least it makes
sense. Research, both in the natural and the social sciences,
is increasingly computer based, and research into computer
applications is clearly important for technology based futures,
in peace or in war.
The use of computers for teaching and learning in higher
education has been slower to develop over this period, largely
confined to undergraduate service courses and individual
enthusiasms. At the same time this general support for
improved computer facilities in the research community has
stimulated a new wave of research into learning processes;
sometimes attracting into that field a less parochial array of
investigators than have traditionally been interested in the
somewhat low status matter of human cognition.
What has emerged from this is an academic community of
computer- based learning experts of a peculiar character, not
necessarily rooted, as are other academic groups of educators
in England, in an intimate knowledge of, and commitment to, the
processes of mass schooling. Some are, some are not, but the
multi-disciplinary nature of computer-based learning research
generates multiple agendas, and some uneasy inter-dependencies.
And when such a community is called upon to service the needs
of schools, it would be surprising if the link between research
and action proved to be unproblematic, or indeed the
commitment to the mission wholehearted in every case.
Support for CBL research has varied sources, but the most
important has been the Council which, in the early eighties
identified information technology in education as a priority
area. Reports were commissioned, discussions and workshops
held to begin to define a programme of substantive research.
The Council recognised the importance of involving
practitioners and policymakers in this process, and of links
with commercial organisations in the computer industries. It
appointed a Co-ordinator to develop this national process of
deliberation and in 1988 announced a five-year, L3 million
initiative. The intention was to, support ten or eleven multi-
disciplinary, multi-institutional teams for three-year periods
to carry out a broad range of basic research, but basic
research with the user market firmly in mind and in touch.
That market was the school teacher market. Let me briefly
summarise some difficulties that arose.
3Firstly, the Council did not maintain its financial commitment.
Only three groups were funded, plus a co-ordinating unit and an
evluation. There was no critical mass , in a sense no
programme.
Secondly, there were few products for ready use, partly because
basic research is a slow process, partly because most
researchers prefer high powered machines, mainly American,
while the schools have low-powered machines, almost exclusively
British, as a result of Government policy. Whose task is it to
do the conversion job? Answer - nobody's. Researchers are
reluctant, they want to go on with their research. After all,
their careers are determined by research success, not by
implementation activities. And the Council's remit is
research, not dissemination.
I'll say no more about the research context in Britain, but as
we leave that context and move to development, we find that the
kind of collective ambivalence that characterises the research
community's attitude to development is writ large across the
range of school-oriented action, to which I now turn.
My Government has also spent a great deal of money, especially
during the last twelve years, promoting computer-based learning
in schools. Like its investment in higher education, this has
also not been evaluated. Unlike that investment, it is not at
all clear why they are doing this or what the Government hopes
to accomplish by it.
In part the obscurity arises because three different Ministries
have been involved in separately financing this promotion - the
Department of Education (which last year resolved its own
ambivalence by changing its title to the Department for
Education), the Department of Trade and Industry, and the
Department of Employment. Although the Cabinet Office
reassures us that the days of inter-Departmental rivalry are
over and a new era of cross-Departmental teamwork ushered in,
what evidence we can muster in the absence of evaluation
suggests that CBL in schools has been, and continues to be
disputed Government territory, with implicated Ministries
pursuing separate, and in some aspects, mutually destructive
agendas. It doesn't help that two of these departments, the
Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of
Employment, have provided schools with hardware and software
without any particular educational end in view, so that we are
left to infer their intentions from their Departmental
responsibilities, and that the third, the Department for
Education, has largely left unstated the educational rationale
that presumably underpinned its various investments throughout
the eighties.
The only thing that is clear is that the Government thinks CBL
is an essential component of the curriculum. In fact it has
now been made mandatory for all teachers and all pupils. But
4no government, least of all mine will continue for ever to
subsidise its provision, and CBI: is still a long way from
solving its problems of widespread implementation in an
educationally defensible form. A combination of blind faith
and insulation from scrutiny - the most striking
characteristics of the hectic activity in this field that we
have witnessed over these twelve years, is surely not the best
way to tackle the problems that have to be overcome before the
future of CBL is entrusted to market forces. We need a
continuing comprehensive overview of a still highly fragmented
constituency in order to construct in a cumulative way an
integrative theory of action.
This is a task for independent evaluation - of policies, of
programmes and of activities on the ground, taking all
interests into impartial account. Evaluation has not to date
been high on the agenda of CBL enthusiasts at any level. Much
has been claimed, little assessed and even less achieved in our
classrooms. Protected by its popularity - kids like it,
parents value it, aspiring politicians wear it like a lapel
badge, CBL has for the most part escaped a number of hard
questions. It is time to ask them now, while the field is
still fluid. If CBL is inevitable in our school systems, then
we must learn from our experience in order to shape its future.
Changing Rhetoric and Changing Times 
Seen as an educational movement, computer based learning
doesn't appear to make sense. Perhaps that's why it doesn't
make progress, in terms of its impact on schooling. Broadly
speaking, it is a thirty year old movement, largely confined to
the. USA for the first decade. It began there as an electronic
page turner in an attempt to revive a dead idea, programmed
learning, and an unpopular psychology, behaviourism, which
confined its development to rigidly controlled instructional
forms. But the educational culture of the time was
progressive, favouring active, social and collaborative
learning.. And America was a dominant, world power with a
buoyant economy, so that even if traditional CAI had been able
to prove its labour saving claims, which it didn't, it was
running against the grain , of curriculum development. It was a
movement without educational credentials.
By the end of the decade the concept of the learner as captive
of the computer was challenged by the concept of the learner as
controller, and throughout the seventies and into the eighties
the voices and the imagery of people like Seymour Papert became
more dominant in the discourse about computer based educational
futures. Computer power was to be placed within the command of
the pupil. In this scenario the teacher as PLATO gives way to
the learner as Einstein, pondering, and I quote, "the simple
rules thatgovern life and the universe." (Bonello-Kubath &
Kubath, 1988)
5Here we have a transformational projection beyond the wildest
dreams of the progressive movement. Let me quote again, "The
goal is also to engender an appreciation of meta-level
intellectual activities which increasingly include assigning
appropriate information processing tasks to machines while
getting on with the higher level human thinking." (McLean,
1982) Now, there are many more modest expressions of these
heady aspirations, but what they all have in common is a
learning environment that is radically different from the
computer managed classrooms of the CAI pioneers and, what is
more to the point, radically opposed to contemporary trends in
schooling. In this hypothesised environment traditional
teaching has no place, the teacher is a facilitator and
orchestrator of a multiple modality, diverse set of learning
activities, the social dimension of learning is restored
through computer-mediated collaborative forms of work, children
learn how to think rather than what to think and develop their
own learning styles.
These are good liberal. ideas. Take out the technology, and
they have a lot in common with the aspirations underlying many
of the curriculum developments of the sixties in my country, or
with the progressive movement in post-war USA. But once again
the computer-based learning community, having transformed
itself and acquired impeccable credentials, is running against
the tide. Because the tide has turned. Those countries which
for twenty years invested heavily in professionally led
curriculum development' have now abandoned that enterprise and
its values, in favour of a centrally controlled production
model of schooling on traditional lines. So the new, revamped
CBL makes no more sense now than the old did in its time.
On the contrary, the prospects for American-style CAI have
never been better. In Britain we have a government of the
radical right which has been in power for thirteen years and
has only recently been re-elected for another five years.
During that time it has taken a decentralised, power-sharing
system of schooling and transformed it into a centralised
system under political control. Let me mention just some of
its features. We have a national curriculum specified in terms
of content and goals for each subject at each stage, and a
national assessment system of attainment'tests to monitor both
individual and collective progress. These tests also function
as a form of comparative accountability for individual teachers
and schools, now under the lay control of governors with
budgetary autonomy. Experimentation in the classroom, or what
we used to call curriculum development, requires the specific
permission of the Minister of Education lhimself. All this is
couched in terms of equality of opportunity and entitlement and
the need to raise standards of course, but what appears to be
emerging is a highly stratified system of schools, teachers and
learners, powered by the values of possessive individualism and
negative interdependence, i.e. a competitive, not a
collaborative learning environment.
6That's what we have, and it is awfully difficult to see in that
context how the kind of learning environment for CBL I
described earlier can be attained. The Minister of Education,
at a Conservative Party conference last month, made the
Government's priorities crystal clear when he called for "back
to the basics" and "traditional" teaching. And he can do it.
As we all know, attainment tests can and do control not just
the content but also pedagogy of provision, and when they are
used, as our Government intends, as a measure of teacher
performance and therefore of teacher competence, then what we
can expect is a high level of standardisation in the
educational process and a level of educational ambition
restricted to what these tests can reliably and validly
measure.
These are precisely the conditions in which traditional CAI can
thrive. It is stable, standardised, universal and measurable,
and therefore commercially viable. And don't think that CAI
has disappeared from American schoolsor been superseded by more
sophisticated and intelligent tutorial systems. Not in market
terms it hasn't. From its early days in the sixties its
marketing strategy was based on a combination of forecasts of
rising labour costs in the public school system of the
USA,falling costs of computer hardware, federal commitment to
subsidising remedial programmes for disadvantaged children, and
a continuing emphasis on basic skills of literacy and numeracy.
Now, almost thirty years on, that commercial strategy is coming
good, both in domestic and export terms. Admittedly federal
subsidy has declined sharply, but the other assumptions were
well-founded. In most respects the educational legacy of
Reagan/Thatcher economics has been remarkably similar. In the
USA, following the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983,
which talked of "unilateral educational disarmament" and of a
"cafeteria-style curriculum", State after State moved quickly
to take more direct control of their school systems, to specify
syllabi, to introduce or extend criterion-referenced
assessment, to emphasise basic skills and transmission
teaching, especially for low-achieving children. And some
people are even talking up the idea of a national curriculum to
raise standards across the USA, thus guaranteeing an
educational 'entitlement' to every child.
As in Britain this egalitarian rhetoric has been heard in some
very elitist quarters, and has been supported by political
groups which should know better. Nothing is better calculated
to reassert and rationalise cultural group dominance than the
imposition of an academic curriculum and an instructional
pedagogy on all children. It is only too easy to see the
attractions of such systems in countries which, like Britain
and the USA, have polarised their societies and, in the context
of bankrupt economic policies, seek political salvation in
protecting the "haves" and controlling the "have nots".
7What does this mean for the future of computer-based learning
in schools? According to a recent review of computer-based
learning in the the USA (Scott, T. et al. 1992), by 1985 some
400,000 public school pupils, the great majority of them from
inner city, culturally disadvantaged populations, were doing
drill and practice CBL on a daily basis, with more
sophisticated CBL confined to wealthy schools. A two tier
system of CBL then, for a two tier society? The commercial
corporations who are busy selling CBL in the USA in the form of
integrated learning packages don't see it that way. The only
market they can see is the inner city market and the only
product they are pushing is the low level, low cost, teacher
free, teacher proof drill and practice in the basic skills
package. It dovetails neatly into the new emphasis on
performance monitoring, with the computer's capacity to
maintain records of achievement for both individuals and
groups.
So is that the future for CBL, in our own inner cities on this
side of the Atlantic? Does it make any sense at all to talk,
as some contemporary advocates do 2 of children "becoming their
own epistemologists" (Bonello-Kubath & Kubath, op.cit.),of
computer based networking "catalysing critical analysis by
students of societal issues that may pose a challenge to the
status quo"? (Cummins & Sayers, 1990) Even if there was a
market, which there isn't, even if there was a profit to be
made from that market, which there isn't, even if any of us had
governments which would back such ideas, which we don't, how is
such a transformation of schooling to be brought about?
CBL and Innovation Theory 
Here the literature of CBL is seriously deficient, both in its
attention to this issue and in its response to it. Sometimes
it seems to be assumed that CBL can realise its intended
effects, on individuals, pairs, or groups, independent of what
else is going on in the classrooms, either before or after, or
contemporaneously. Sometimes, and a great deal of hope rests
on this proposition, it is argued that CBL is a powerful agent
of change, capable of compelling a reconstruction of the
learning environment, i.e. the catalytic power of CBL, the
Trojan horse theory of transformation. And sometimes, much
more so in recent years with growing recognition of the social
nature of effective learning, teacher education is seen to be
the key.
The point is that these are all discredited beliefs. You
wouldn't think, reading the CBL literature, that we have thirty
or forty years of experience, bitter experience of the most
part, of curriculum innovations intended to achieve the kind of
transformation that CBL enthusiasts dream of. We began by
thinking it would be easy, a matter of rewriting the textbooks
or of producing and disseminating curriculum packages, went on
from that simplistic view to a new slogan, "No curriculum
8development without teacher development", and from that to the
realisation that institutional change was a necessary
precondition of teachers being able to change. By this time
the very notion of single innovations having the power to
change learning environments had been discarded,the illusion
that they could only sustained by the temporary infusion of
additional resources and rewards. The institution was the
catalyst, not the innovation, neutralising and assimilating
every intervention that constituted a threat to its
arrangements, values and habits. And schools themselves were,
as Ernest House pointed out in his classic evaluation of the
politics of innovation, 'frozen' institutions, locked in the
social order of the institutional structure of social
management and control. (House, 1974)
This massive failure, in terms of its objectives, of a
professionally led movement to modernise schooling and improve
its quality, made it easy, both in the USA and in Britain, for
governments to step in and take control of schooling in the
ways I have summarised, to marginalise the , infrastructure
professionals, or the 'educational establishment' as our Prime
Minister calls us, and to put into reverse the
professionalisation of teachers, replacing that concept with
something closer to ,a workbench view of teaching.
But my main point at this juncture is how insulated the CBL
community seems to be from this body of experience and
strategic thinking about educational change, from matters that
preoccupy other groups concerned with school improvement. Of
course, CBL is different from other educational innovations,
even technological ones like radio and television, whose
advocated also promised a revolution, but which have settled
for a modest place in the classroom. It's an evolving
innovation, constantly changing its form, its capabilities and
therefore its educational possibilities. It is dominated by
technology push and by computer specific interests,
compulsively chasing an ever constant horizon. The lumpen,
recalcitrant, slow moving mass of the real world of schooling
can be seen as an irritating distraction. Some of the names
given to contemporary software programmes invite such comment.
Take Shopping on Mars, or The Alternative Reality Kit, for
example. Why bother with the real world when you can invent
your own?
But we are here to discuss IT in education, and we are invited
to take seriously the claim that CBL, is an educational
movement, that is to say a movement intent upon changing
educational practice by, in its own terms, emancipating and
empowering learners. Where, when and how are questions that
are put to other innovations - why not to CBL? And that raises
a big question. 	 As the gap grows between the educational
imagination of the inventors and the ideological and economic
feasibility of their scenarios (rising software costs having
9replaced hardware costs as the main financial disincentive) why
do governments continue to invest in it?
At this point I want to switch my focus away from the USA,
which I have used mainly to illustrate the directions which the
commercial dynamic is taking, and focus on the case I know best
- England. Now I know that there are many different countries
represented at this Conference, all at-historically different
points of engagement with the development of CBL, as they are
with respect to overhaul of school systems and curricula. For
some, perhaps even most, CBL is something new in educational
settings, a genuine untried innovation, for which they are
still seeking government support. Do not despair. If England
is anything to go by, you'll get it, and keep it no matter what
happens.
In my country, •CBL is the long distance runner of post-war
curriculum development. It could even be called the sole
survivor, with a record of twenty years of continuous
Government backing. In that time a hundred other ideas for
improving the quality of educational practice have come and
gone - taken the money, had a go, and left little trace. None
of them achieved the promised transformation, though some were
influential for a while, and some founded traditions, in action
research, in teacher education and in school development, which
embodied the learning curve of which I have spoken, and which
were beginning to flourish before the juggernaut of political
control rolled over them.
CBL in Britain, on the other hand, has had more public and
private money (including voluntary parental contributions)
invested in it than any other innovations, some £200 million
pounds in the past twenty years, nearly all of it in the last
decade. And still it goes on, despite the successive failure
of successive investments. There is little to show in terms of
educational impact. There isn't much on any scale, and most of
what there is would blush for shame in the light of even a
benevolent educational critique. CBL is truly the phoenix of
educational innovation.
Now, some of the reasons for this apparently indestructible
faith in the future of CBL are obvious, and they are the
reasons why I suggest that those of you who don't have
government backing will get it.
The Industrial Rationale 
We live in an increasingly computer-dependent world, a process
that is already irreversible whether we look at industry,
commerce, war or social management and services, whether we
look West or East, North or South, at the developed, developing
or third world economies. It is also an increasingly
competitive world of economic interdependence, in which, for
Western nations at least, the command of computer power is seen
10
to be an essential precondition of competitive success in
wealth creation. Computerware and computer-based products are
therefore both an industry and a market in themselves as well
as a means of enhancing the quality and lowering the costs of
other goods and services.
Back in the sixties, European anxieties about the threat posed
to our science-based industrial future by growing American
domination of data-processing and communication technology
rumbled intermittently in the corridors of political power,
some arguing for a European response, others for national
initiatives because of the urgency of the situation. It was
seen to be a task for government, and a comprehensive one, much
influenced by a speech of Hubert Humphrey, then Vice-President
of the USA, in a speech in Paris in 1967, when he said, "If
technological advance occurs more rapidly in the United States
than elsewhere the reason must be sought in educational,
organisational and economic factors."
In 1969 there was a call for action from a British
Parliamentary Committee, and in 1973 the first major Government
initiative in CBL was launched, an initiative which in its
structure embodied, for the first time, an explicit link
between economic development and educational development.
But more of that later. The issue is, its all very well to
say there is a link between education and the economy, but what
is it? Some people doubt if there is one. Certainly
international comparisons of national investment levels in
education bear no systematic relationship to economic
prosperity. This doesn't stop people from all over the West
trooping over to Japan, looking in their schools for
explanations of the Japanese miracle. What they find is rote
learning and the encouragement, by parents and teachers, of a
degree of competitive intensity between pupils that mocks any
notion of schooling as a civilising process. The parallel
trends in the USA and Britain are moderate by comparison.
But all Western governments feel more and more compelled to
intervene in the educational systems they provide - not just to
control costs and win votes, although failing economies
invariably scapegoat schooling, but to assert a view of the
relationship between education and the economy. This always
involves a projection of labour market needs, an increasingly
hazardous exercise in the context of global economics.
Twenty years ago, about the time when the term 'computer
literacy' was coined and advocated as an essential addition to
the traditional view of basic skills, the general view was that
the advanced industrial nations needed a large, highly skilled
workforce to man the technology-based and technologised
workplaces of the future. That view has since become more
complicated by a number of factors - the main ones being the
unexpectedly fast and fierce growth of competitiveness in that
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marketplace of
draining away
internationals,
applications to
the developing world with its low unit costs,
investment in the West by the mobile
and the increasing capacity of computer-based
deskill some occupations and eliminate others.
For the free marketeers who have ruled Britain for the past
thirteen years, the response has been to privatise public
utilities and publicly owned industries, leaving them free to
pursue profitability without regard to social considerations,
and to urge automation of labour-intensive skilled occupations.
The cost of these policies is a growing problem of social
management - of rising levels of unemployment, rising levelS of
crime, rising levels of discontent among the underemployed, and
political turbulence and instability. It is not just a British
problem - there are now some sixteen million unemployed in the
European Community, three of them in Britain.
The point is that the kind of economic and technological
determinism that powered the rhetoric of government
intervention in the sixties and seventies drew its confidence
from an industrial , projection predicated on high tech skills
and full employment. That projection has not been fulfilled,
and has been replaced by a scenario of labour-saving
capitalisation of a scaled-down manufacturing base with a very
limited requirement for high-tech, high fliers, a larger
requirement of low paid, minimally skilled minders, and a
permanent , pool of work seekers surplus to requirements. In
these circumstances we are entitled to ask "what now is the
rationale of government support for CBL in schools j given so
little evidence of its educational effectiveness?" In the
absence of a satisfactory answer, we may be tempted to conclude
that it has little to do with education, and everything to do
with providing a hidden subsidy to the IT industry and with
using schools.as a lever to persuade industrialists to invest
in technology. This still leaves us with the question of what
the Government wants from CBL. Although successive governments
in the UK have so far backed the professionals' opposition to
drill and practice CAI, this still remains the most common form
of CBL in our classrooms, and it's not difficult to imagine
that a cost-conscious government with a 'back to basics' war
cry, having established through curriculum control the
conditions in which high volume, low cost technology can
flourish, will at some point be tempted in that direction. But
leaving that option on one side, we can still pose the
question. If it is no longer computer literacy for all, what
is it? Computer deference, computer loyalty? Better
education, or anything goes acclimatisation?
As we shall see, it's a rather confused picture, not least
because of the uncertainties surrounding the future of the IT
industry itself in the British economy to which I will now
briefly turn.
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Notwithstanding the political demand for comprehensive
government action in 1969 to galvanise IT development, the
computer industry continued to languish throughout the
seventies and by 1983 was in a mess - fragmented, small in
world terms, with a rapidly growing trade deficit, unable to
finance its own research and development needs. This was two
years after the Japanese launched their fifth generation
computing programme.
The Government responded with a five year, £350 million pound
initiative, in advanced information technology, designed to
improve the competitive position of the IT industry. It was a
collaboration between government, industry and academia, with
£70 million going to the universities, who were becoming adept
at sustaining their computer interests by varying their
proposals to suit the priorities and requirements of a changing
pattern of sponsorship, in this case the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, the Ministry of Defence and the Science and
Engineering Research Council. This was pre-competitive . Rand D,
a concept which rationalises costs and risk among competitors
to establish a shared technology base before they separate to
compete in the market.
It was assumed that the programme would be followed by a second
and even a third phase, in the hope that it would -establish a
structural change in the organisation of IT R & D on the basis
of which the national industry could flourish.
In the event these hopes were dashed and there was no
continuation into the nineties. The main strategic goal was
not achieved. The industry continued to decline, market shares
dropped, some industries passed into foreign ownership.
won t go into the reasons, as given by the programme
evaluators, but its difficult not to agree with them that too
much too soon was expected of the initiative, especially in the
context of a general decline in the economy. The Government
continues to look for cost-effective ways of marshalling the
necessary resources for industrial resurgence in IT, as indeed
does the European Community, but continues to be restricted by
the political disease of short-termism, and the lack of will to
invest in sufficient scale to match the problem. Both these
problems have also afflicted educational investment, as we
shall see.
There are two points I want to make about this initiative. The
first is that it was independently evaluated and the evaluation
published, hardly surprising perhaps in a country that has
insisted, for some years now, that all venture capital
programmes be submitted to external scrutiny, but a scrutiny,
which is notable for its absence in the area of CBL educational
investment. The second is that, although I have mentioned both
the strategic and the structural goals of the initiative, these
were at no stage of the initiative clearly set out - they were
in fact reconstructed by the evaluators through a process of
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sifting and synthesising the documentation. Well, that seems
to fit the old saying - "If you don't know where you're going,
any road will do." Little wonder that many of the participants
cried, "foul" when the initiative was pronounced a failure.
That is the background, political, educational and economic,
against which most of the educational initiatives I will
describe has been played out. Keep it in mind as we go on from
here.
The Development of Computer-based Learning in England
In 1973 the Government launched the first of a series of
initiatives in CBL, called the National Development Programme
in Computer Assisted Learning, with development in Higher
Education its major focus. I was responsible for the
educational evaluation of that Programme. This was followed,
at the beginning of the eighties, with a second major
initiative, this time confined to the schools, and concerned to
promote and exploit the micro-processor revolution. There was
no evaluation. By the second half of the eighties, there were
a number of initiatives in the field, emanating from three
different Ministries, variously concerned with programme
development, infrastructure, hardware supply, software subsidy,
teacher education and support. But again, no independent
evaluation, or virtually none.
The main facts are that in the eighties the government invested
some £180 million in the development of CBL in the school
system, and that at the end of it CBL was made mandatory for
all schools, all teachers, all children as part of the national
curriculum.
The first thing to say about that is that it is an astonishing
outcome. Nothing that we know about the current state and
status of CBL in the schools remotely suggests that it is ready
for the kind of freezing process entailed in the production
model of schooling, and nothing that we know about the state
and status of CBL's in the curriculum resources market remotely
suggests that it can be safely left to claim its share of
individual school budgets.
In 1988 we were asked by one government ministry to do a quick
' state of the nation' report on CBL in schools and to make
recommendations. Let me read you some extracts from that
Report to underline these points.
"Primary schools, by virtue of their organisation and freedom
from exam pressures, lend themselves to good educational
deployment of computers - group collaboration and cross-
curricular work. Although good practice has been slow to
emerge, the last two years have seen a breakthrough, on the
part of some teachers in some schools, to experimental and
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innovatory practice that constitutes a departure from drill and
practice, instructional routines.... It remains true, however,
that even the few computers available (and it is still few
despite the increase) are far from being fully utilised."
"The situation in the secondary schools is considerably worse,
despite the greater number of computers available to teachers.
Initially devoted to support examination courses in Computer
and Business Studies, they were, and to some extent still are,
confined to a few teachers and students. The notion of cross-
curricular application is still, for the most part, just
dawning on teachers, and computer enthusiasts are having a hard
time promoting across the school use."
"In both sectors more equipment is needed, and existing
equipment needs replacing and updating. Teacher training, both
in-service and pre-service, is also a prime requirement.
Children are well-disposed towards computers, teachers less so,
either because they feel imcompetent,or because the available
facilities are inadequate, or because they are not convinced of
the educational potential."
"In 1988 it is clear that a beachhead in the schools has been
established, but no more. The basic need, for more and better
machinery, remains a priority that can only be met from central
funding. The need for more and better educational practice is
just as critical. One will not take us much further without
the other. Both require central support." (MacDonald et al,
1988)
This picture of CBL in schools has since been confirmed by
other surveys and estimates, including one which said that the
schools needed another 150,000 machines simply to meet the
ratios required by the National Curriculum.
Many CBL enthusiasts have hailed the incorporation into the
mandatory curriculum as the breakthrough they've been hoping
for, the coercive element ensuring that it is taken seriously
and spreads rapidly through teacher training and curriculum
practice. That is perfectly true, but the enthusiasm is surely
misplaced. Taken at its face value, that is to say treated
like any other curriculum requirement - no subsidies, no more
than its fair share of the paltry £30 million the Government
has made available for the implementation of the national
curriculum, it would in my view constitute an abandonment of
CBL to a predictable fate - poor practice, almost instant
obsolescence and widespread teacher disillusion and cynicism.
Surely the Government doesn't mean it. If it does, then the
story of what happened in the eighties has less import. But I
don't believe it for one moment. It doesn't make sense in
terms of the Government's continuing commitment to an IT
future. Of course, on the other hand, I don't believe that the
Government's intentions with respect to CBL support are based
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on a realistic calculation of the costs of institutionalising
and sustaining CBL. Even ballpark figures for such an
enterprise are rare, hardly surprising when one American
(Lickleder, 1984) was bold enough to estimate the cost of a
ten-year programme to provide and support an electronic desk
for every American pupil at $130 billion. Some support will,
however, be provided.
If that view is correct, then CBL will continue to be treated
as an exceptional case calling for ad hoc investment by
government, and that makes the experience of the past twenty
years significant in terms of the lessons it has to offer about
how best that commitment can effectively be discharged.
Let us look first at the lessons from the seventies that should
have, and perhaps did provide a basis for investment in the
eighties, and I am referring here to the previously mentioned
National Development Programme in CAL, a five year initiative
that a team, under my direction, evaluated.
The Case of the National Programme as a Model Initiative 
The launching of the Programme, together with its organisation
and strategy marked a significant departure on the part of
Government, at that time a Conservative Government, with Mrs
Thatcher as. Minister of Education, from the established
machinery and style that had for ten years dominated the
curriculum development mission. Till then curriculum
development had been largely left to professional control, to
the so-called educational establishment, through ad hoc
agencies such as,' in the case of schools, the Schools Council
and to a lesser and more specialised extent the National
Council for Educational Technology. Now it could be said that
the Programme, , which encompassed further and higher education
as well as schools, and industrial and military training, was
toobroad in its scope to be suitably allocated to any of these
agencies. Much more influential than that, however, was the
fact that the Government was fed up with the failure of these
agencies to achieve widespread take up of their projects, which
it attributed to a culture of soft-nosed persuasion and respect
for teacher choice.
Perhaps even more influential was the adoption by Government of
a new role for its own civil servants in government
departments, the role of actively securing departmental
objectives. Managerialism had come to Whitehall, and its first
embodiment was the Programme. Instead of farming out the two
and a half million pound programme to the established agencies,
the Government set up a task force under the management of an
ad hoc committee of civil servants from the seven contributing
ministries, all with a direct or indirect interest either in
education or the computer industry, under the chairmanship of
the Ministry of Education.
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The Programme marked the beginning of hands-on control by
Government, of collaboration between Ministries, and of a hard-
nosed approach influenced by systems theory and management by
objectives. The Committee appointed a small professional
Directorate, commissioned two evaluations (the other one was
financial) and invited bids for funds. Funding took the form
of matched funding, by which applicants had to put up the
equivalent resource commitment to that which they sought, and
stepped funding, putting continuity at risk by making it
dependent upon satisfactory progress at the end of each
tranche. Whether or not progress was satisfactory was a matter
for Committee to decide on the basis of reports by the
Programme Director and the evaluators. That was basically the
new model. Thirty-five projects were funded, and the Committee
met five or six times a year to consider their progress.
In our final report to the Committee, we commented at length on
the programme as a model for future government investment,
since the continuation of an active government role in CBT
looked essential, and in particular on its value as an
instrument of public learning.
We began by conceding that at first sight the Programme
appeared to be a well designed instrument. It stimulated and
supported a range of computer applications in many areas of
already visible development, it enabled the exploration of
alternative pedagogies, it involved increasing numbers of
teachers and students in these activities. Through its diverse
evaluative mechanisms the Programme generated an enormous yield
of information about its investments and created channels
through which this information flowed regularly from the coal
faces of experience to the learning centre of the organisation
where it could be sifted and stored. Since this centre had
direct links into the executive agencies of Government, as well
as into the independent research bureaucracies, the Programme
seemed to be well designed not only to fulfil its own needs for
ongoing informed control but also to generate specialised
expertise to guide government action in the future.
But close analysis suggested otherwise. We made a number of
points.
A task force, by definition, has a terminal date, in this case
the end of 1977. What happens to its expertise? The key
figures to look at in this respect were those which concerned
the dissipation of those whose full-time involvement in the
Programme gave them opportunities to acquire expertise, i.e.
the project development staff and the Directorate. At the end
only one in five of the development staff had any prospect of
continuity in their institutions, and the Directorate packed
their bags and departed the educational field. No doubt this
dissipation was of some help to IT industry and commerce, but
the point is it was no longer available to the Government.
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This leads us to consider the learning capital accumulated by
the permanent civil servants on the Programme Committee, a
resource surely to be stored and reemployed to shape the
future. There are several points to be made here. These were
general administrators, not experts in the field. What is more
the little time available at meetings, plus the need to get
through a crowded agenda, meant they had limited opportunity to
engage in more than cursory discussions of particular projects
and almost no time to assimilate and distil the overall
experience as it unfolded. In consequence there was •a de facto
delegation of responsibility for judgement to the full-time
Directorate, the real centre of Programme learning with direct
and continuous access to the projects and to the independent
evaluation teams. But, and it is a big but, the civil servants
remained accountable to their political masters for the success
of a programme over which they exercised no more than boundary
control. They were de facto compelled to place their trust in
the Director. This placed them in a very vulnerable position-
hypersensitive to criticism, resistant to self-examination, and
almost invariably hostile to the policy and management aspects
of the evaluation we tried to implement.
There is a further point. Even if we concede that the civil
servants acquired a valuable stock of learning, that learning
was itself certain to be dissipated because civil servants in
the British government are moved frequently, both within
departments and across ministries.
Our view, in summary, was that the Government's preference for
a non-institutional and essentially ephemeral structure had
paid a high price in terms of the retention of expertise for
future use. By not entrusting the responsibility to the
obvious candidate - The National Council for Educational
Technology, which was confined to a purely administrative role
with respect to the Programme, it meant that the central UK
agency for educational technology had been denied an
opportunity to acquire the depth of experience that might have
institutionalised the management expertise which such
initiatives call for.
We concluded this analysis by saying that innovation structures
like the Programme, each time they are created to meet a
particular need, may have to re-invent the learning wheel.
That evaluation report was neither published nor disseminated
by the Government. We submitted it to the Ministry of
Education for circulation, but I discovered much later that it
was not even disseminated to the members of the Programme
Committee. We were ourselves free to publish, but we could not
persuade a commercial publisher to take it on, and did not have
the means ourselves to give it effective circulation (it was,
and remains, almost four hundred pages long).
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At this point, I had better say something about the evaluation
of the Programme, since it may have had something to do with
the subsequent disappearance of evaluation from subsequent
initiatives.
Back in the early sixties, the model of evaluation then
prevalent was associated with behavioural objectives. You took
any educational innovation, turned its aims into learning
objectives, and employed evaluators as measurers of intended
outcomes. In the course of the sixties, this model came in for
a lot of criticism. It was not informative enough, not helpful
enough with explanations of shortfall so there was a big
movement, of which I was part, away from the measurement of
outcomes towards more descriptive/interpretive studies that
concentrated on depicting the circumstances, processes and
difficulties of innovation, offering a better understanding of
the problems of introducing new practices. Naturalistic forms
of enquiry evolved in this context.
This alternative movement in evaluation was making a lot of
headway and by the seventies had become the dominant approach
in England to the evaluation of educational activities.
Coming up to the Programme, I myself had added to this approach
a more explicitly political dimension, seeing evaluation as a
form of democratic accountability for public expenditure in
education, with this accountability by no means confined to the
success or otherwise of the Programme implementation, but
extended to include management and policymaking
responsibilities. The Programme was the first real test of the
viability and resilience of this approach. Conflict, at least
between the Committee and our evaluation, was inevitable.
They wanted hard, simple, quantifiable measures of success and
failure. This is perfectly understandable - with the shift to
policy concerns and centralised decision-making, we found
ourselves dealing with decision-makers with neither the time
nor the patience to deal with complex information, nor with the
contradictions or ambivalence that tend to characterise
particular cases of educational action.
This kind of evaluation tends also to pose another difficulty.
When as an evaluator you look very closely at what educators
are doing, and you are able to take full account of the
constraints under which they operate, you may well conclude
that those activities need changing if they are to become
effective, but you are also likely to vindicate the actions of
those responsible as being intelligent people working with
integrity on difficult problems. The implication is usually
that these people need more help with the problem and this is
not a conclusion that universally finds favour with those whose
priority may be to cut out wasteful activity, and to include
the people involved with the waste. For this purpose an
aims/achievement model of evaluation affords far more freedom,
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since it will inevitably
making it much easier to
providers of the service.
reveal failure without explanation,
blame the performers rather than the
shall try to summarise the long battle with Programme
Committee in the form of a proposition/counter proposition that
encapsulates the main points of the dispute.
1. They wanted an aims/achievement model of evaluation. Thefunded projects were required to state their objectives before
they got any money. They wanted an evaluation focus on whether
those objectives were achieved.
We said no - that was unfair. None of the projects would
achieve all their objectives - so they would all fail on that
criterion. We would portray their efforts to achieve those
objectives so that the Committee could judge whether they were
engaged in worthwhile activities, given their constraints and
opportunities.
2. They wanted us to make recommendations about which projects
should be supported 9 which terminated.
We said no - it was their task and responsibility to make such
judgements, not ours. They would have to read the evaluation
reports, and make up their minds. We are just brokers of
information - go-betweens linking people and institutions who
want to trade knowledge of each other.
3. They wanted us to add to the written reports - to tell
things about the projects we could not put in the reports.
We said no - no secret reporting. Our reports were
negotiated with the people whose work we commented on, and
given to the Committee until those people agreed they
accurate, relevant and fair. We would not add to them.
them
all
not
were
4. They said the reports were too long and too complex for abusy Committee to deal with. Could we not summarise them?
We said they were as short as we could make them and still
negotiate them with the people whose work was being evaluated.
We serve the judgement, not the judge.
5. They said - but we cannot handle all this complexity - are
you saying we should not be making these decisions?
We said - that is for you to say, and for others who read the
evaluation report on the work of this Committee.
6. 	 They said - what
Committee? 	 We don't
projects.
We said - we're afraid
gather information about
how you do your work,
whether you are doing a
do you mean, the evaluation of this
want you to evaluate us, only the
we must - it would not be fair only to
. the projects. They want to know about
whether you reached your objectives,
good job.
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7. They said - who do you think you are? We are paying you to
do as we say.
We said - we are your democratic independent evaluators.
Simply because you pay for the evaluation does not mean that
you have any special claim on its services, or exemption from
its focus. You cannot buy an evaluation, you can only sponsor
one. Anyone has a right to raise questions and issues for
inclusion on the agenda of the evaluation, and no-one has the
right to ask for information without being prepared to give it.
This conflict began with our very first report and continued to
our last. In the first report we have been concerned with
policy, and raised the issue of the relationship between the
educational programme and the IT industry. Besides objecting
to our interest (they thought it was none of our business) they
totally rejected the idea that there was any relationship,
despite the fact that the Ministries of Trade and Industry were
represented on the Committee, and that they consistently argued
for the support of British only computers.
CBL in Schools - The Eighties Initiatives 
Let us move on to the eighties now, and to Government
initiatives focussed on CBL in schools. I can't cover all of
them, and none in any detail. But what we are looking for is
evidence of the development of the Government's approach to
supporting CBL, What lessons were learnt, what was changed,
what continued from the legacy of the seventies. I'll try to
summarise the main points.
1. The NDPCAL model was not repeated.
2. External evaluation was dropped.
3. The Ministries concerned went their own ways, pursuing
their own interests, more in competition than collaboration.
In particular the Departments of Education and of Trade and
Industry pursued parallel interventions, but in an
uncoordinated way, which caused serious problems at time
because of their unplanned and uncoordinated interaction. For
instance, the mainEducation initiative - the Microelectronics
Programme (MEP) was forced prematurely to take into account the
main Trade and Industry initiative, to make British machines
available to schools on a matched funding basis. This put
immense pressure on MEP, which had a brief to build an
infrastructure of support for CBL throughout the country and to
train teachers and to produce software for the whole range of
curriculum subjects, to do all three at the same time because
the schools were (relatively) flooded with machines.
4. MEP was given only three years for this massive task
anyway, although it was belatedly extended for another two.
The result was a failed attempt at the 'cascade' model of
teacher training, and the sponsorship of software production at
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high speed to meet the immediate need. It was, if you like, a
social Darwinian approach to software production, with quantity
not quality the criterion - what a critic called the "Let a
thousand weeds bloom" approach. (Self, J. 1987)
5. MEP was set up in a non-institutionalised form, being
located in a semi-detached house in a northern city, with a
small Directorate. But it didn't have a Programme Committee,
instead an Advisory Committee on which the three principal
agencies of support for CBL development were represented.
However, MEP was not allowed to devolve a share of its
responsibilities to these agencies. Control and direction was
retained by the Ministry in London.
6. As a result, MEP was entangled and strangled by its
controlling bureaucracy, unable to learn and respond to its
emerging and significantly underestimated workload without long
delays in obtaining permission from London, and subject to
uninformed interference.
Here are some quotes from a suppressed report by the Director
of MEP, that indicate some of his frustration.
- planning and much of the development work was far too
rushed."
- there was an expectation of results and attitude changes in
far too short a time, and this pressurised people."
" - no innovatory programme with such a remit should start with
less than five full years after all appointments have been
taken up."
- the staff should be trusted or not appointed.
	 Lack of
trust 	 results 	 in 	 interference 	 and 	 counter-productivefrustration."
" - innovation requires its own skills, and these are usually
not understood by bureaucracy."
And here is a longer comment.
"During the five and a half years of the Programme, there were
two Secretaries of State to whom it was responsible. More
direct links were made to Parliamentary Under Secretaries of
State, and MEP reported to three. During the last nine months,
the Programme was linked to a Minister of State. At the
officer level, the Programme was responsible to three different
Under Secretaries, and these were supported by two Assistant
Secretaries and three Principals. The longest contact was with
one Principal who was responsible for four and a quarter years.
Because of the short length of time that the Programme was
linked to other people, it was very difficult to establish any
depth of understanding and appreciation of its purpose. Thus
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MEP was very dependent on the views of the one Principal
referred to above for its political image within the
Department. It is no criticism of this individual, who was
generally supportive and helpful, to suggest that this was not
the most satisfactory arrangement, particularly when the
Department was so closely involved in agreeing the Programme's
activities."
We can see clearly from this account, which would of course be
disputed by the Ministry, that MEP was significantly different
from NDPCAL in terms of the distribution of power and control.
If the Director is to be believed, here we have the worst of
all possible worlds - professional entrepreneurs under distant,
underinformed but authoritarian control of the accountable
civil servants.
MEP finished in 1986, it's work, I am told (and here we are in
the realm of personal testimony and rumour) rubbished by the
Ministry, its Director's recommendation for' continuity of the
experienced central staff team ignored. I've also been told
that the Director, in a fury of frustration and anger, shredded
the entire files of five years' work. Bad news for historians,
of course, and worse in the absence of any evaluation
MEP, the pump-priming initiative, was followed by MESU, the
Microelectronics Support Unit, which was supposed to exploit
and take further the fruits of MEP. But there was a gap of a
year before a Director for MESU was appointed and, given the
shredding, a rather difficult task of continuity. But in any
case, again according to personal testimony, MESU was
instructed by the Ministry to start again and do everything
differently.
MESU began life in 1987 and continued to 1989. It, . like MEP,
began life in yet another city, and its own premises, though
with a much larger staff. It's planning too was encumbered by
othr goverment initiatives as well as bureaucratic decision-
making. Within- .a year it was amalgamated with the National
Council for Educational Technology, based in London, a quasi-
independent professional agency, but in reality totally under
Ministry of Education control. This control was made explicit
at around this time by the appointment to Chief Executive of
the Council of a civil servant from the Ministry. Soon after,
both the central teams of MEP and MESU, including the
Directors, had packed their bags and gone.
Public Learning and Political Control - Concluding Comments
The account that I have sketched of government initiatives in
the eighties is neither sufficiently comprehensive (there were
many different initiatives, each seeking to plug a gap) nor
sufficiently detailed to do justice to a period of intense
activity in the promotion of CBL in schools. It is also a
highly contestable account, not in any sense authorised by or
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negotiated with anyone. In the absence of evaluation, no
impartial account is available. Nevertheless, even this bare
and contentious outline allows lao address issues that are
central to the conduct of policy. One advantage of the task
force of civil servants set up to manage the National Programme
in the seventies was that it could escape the cumbersome and
slow processes of authorisation that are characteristic of
executive bureaucracies. This advantage was sacrificed in the
eighties in favour of the restoration of ministry control,
which trapped the entrepreneurial professionals in a web of
spirit-sapping delays and widened the gap in knowledge and
understanding between those in day-to-day contact with the
realities of practitioner needs and priorities and those who
controlled them. The Director of MEP, for instance, with a
budget of £9 million, could not buy an item costing more than
£50 without authorisation. The de facto power of the
professional director of the National Programme, to which we
referred in our analysis, was not repeated in the subsequent
initiatives. The result, given the combination of short time
scales and ludicrously underestimated tasks, was productivity
without quality control.
We had also, in our critique, pointed to the high cost of
temporary structures in terms of the dissipation of expertise
and of learning from experience, but the initiatives of the
eighties reinforced rather than countered this argument. The
Government continued to bypass the established agencies of
professional support and to ditch experienced personnel, whilst
at the same time failing to provide from its own ranks the
stability of responsibility over time that would have mitigated
the severity of this loss. As vehicles of public learning,
these initiatives were meagre in their yield. This would
matter less if the experience of these initiatives did not make
it clear that the Government is far from finding a form of
successful synthesis between political accountability and
professional expertise.
From this perspective it is difficult to see the eighties as
other than a period of decline in the conduct of policy. I
have attributed this to a failure of learning, but we can't
leave out of account other factors - the increasing
determination of Government to undermine professional influence
on the development of education, the continuing uncertainty of
purpose at the heart of the CBL enterprise, and the demands of
the Treasury for ever tighter control of ministerial
expenditure. But there is a more fundamental problem that
arises from the shift from professional to civil servant
responsibility for the management of change. For politicians,
to whom these civil servants are accountable, the admission of
error is highly problematic. Opponents will call for their
resignation should they be foolish enough to confess that their
initiatives have been seriously flawed. The civil servant
managers of these initiatives know this well, and are reluctant
to be the bringers of bad tidings to their ministers.
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Programmes must appear to succeed even when they clearly have
failed. These requirements severely restrict the possibilities
of public learning when administrators are thrust into the
front line as managers. Professionals, on the other hand. (and
I include academics in this broad category) recognise that the
detection of error is essential to the construction of
expertise and the advancement of knowledge. For them progress
is a learning curve. Little wonder, in view of this
phenomenon, that independent evaluation, which has a specific
responsibility for contributing to and preserving what is
learned from experience, are not in demand in a context-CBL,
where the Government has assumed direct responsibility for a
major area of educational investment.
But this really won't do, and I think the widespread complicity
of CBL activists in this insulation from external scrutiny is
something they will come to regret as the real world closes
round their interests and aspirations. The CBL field has a
poor record in evaluation, with almost all the efforts in
evaluation devoted to a highly restricted set of questions
concerned with comparative efficiency of simple instructional
systems. It has an even poorer record in constructing
appropriate forms of assessment for its claimed learning
outcomes, leaving itself wide open to the crudities of
contemporary attainment tests. Although I have emphasised in
this presentation those issues which call for programme and
policy evaluation, I perhaps need to remind you that it is the
task of evaluation also to map the impact of CBL on learners as
a basis for the construction of assessment. One - widely
conceded virtue, of the evaluation, which I led, of the
National Programme in the seventies was that, by studying the
educational activities of the range of supported projects, we
were able to infer their educational rationales and to
construct paradigms of the various learning and teaching
theories implicit in their practice. We also began, but to a
more limited extent, to develop idiographic approaches to the
analysis of student engagement with the computer, attempting to
shift the approach to assessment from the achievement of
prespecified outcomes to the post-hoc justification of the
educational experiences provided.
We saw these products of the evaluation as a resource for
further research and development, as well as for future
evaluations, and there is some evidence that at least some
research groups found them useful. But the Government
continued throughout the eighties to leave research out of the
policy equation, concentrating its resources on development.
The irony is that its major investment in the eighties, the
Micros in Schools Programme, proceeded without an educational
rationale. It didn't have time to construct one, and it never
heard about ours.
One final point. CBL is the best example one could find of an
educational 	 innovation 	 that 	 straddles 	 a 	 highly
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compartmentalised, territorialed set of implicated interests.
The problem is how these interests can be brought together in
the most effectively synchronised way in order to shape its
future. One of the advantages of evaluation is that it can
cross territorial boundaries to an extent that is either
impractical or unacceptable for those who live and work within
its boxes. CBL is a case that calls for external evaluation.
It can also tell the people what's going one Not before time.
Postscript
In my country the Universities Funding Council has just
launched its latest computer initiative - a three year £15
million programme in CBL undergraduate teaching. It's
principal aim is to reduce the level of required staffing by
the construction of common core, multi-site computer-based
programmes, Sound familiar? Oh, and by the way, there's no
independent evaluation.
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